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Vanguard Piping v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Sept. 19, 2013)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE—DISCOVERY 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined whether NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) compels disclosure of all 
insurance agreements, regardless of whether the primary policy limits exceed the amount 
of potential liability or whether the policies provide secondary coverage. 
 
Disposition 
 
 The Court concluded that the plain language of NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires 
disclosure of any insurance agreement that may be liable to pay a portion of a judgment.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
  
 Aventine-Tramonti Homeowners Association filed construction defect actions 
against petitioners Vanguard Piping Systems, Inc.; Viega, LLC; Industies, Inc.; and 
Viega, Inc. (collectively, Vanguard), and Vanguard’s German parent companies Viega 
GmbH and Viega International GmbH. In June 2012, the Nevada Supreme Court entered 
a stay of the district court proceedings as to the German parent companies. The stay order 
did not stay or in any way limit any other proceedings against Vanguard. 
 During discovery, pursuant to NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D), Vanguard disclosed some of 
its primary insurance agreements to Aventine-Tramonti. The special master then ordered 
Vanguard to disclose the additional undisclosed agreements. Vanguard refused and 
sought relief from the district court, arguing that disclosing the documents would violate 
the stay of proceedings against the German parent companies and that it had already 
complied with NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D)’s requirements by disclosing its primary insurance 
agreements that were sufficient to cover any judgment against it. The district court 
affirmed the special master’s order and this writ for mandamus or prohibition followed.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court first disposed of Vanguard’s argument that producing the agreements 
would violate the stay entered by the Court with regard to the German parent companies. 
The Court noted that the referenced stay temporarily halted the district court proceedings 
as to the German parent companies only.2 Any relevant documents should be produced in 
the proceedings against Vanguard, regardless of whose possession they were in.  
 Next, the Court disposed of Vanguard’s second argument that it should not be 
required to disclose the agreements because Aventine-Tramonti’s counsel sought the 
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1  By Allison Vitangeli. 
2  Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (La Paloma Homeowners’ Ass’n), No. 60015 (Nev. June 13, 2012) 
2  Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (La Paloma Homeowners’ Ass’n), No. 60015 (Nev. June 13, 2012) 
(order granting motion for stay). 
litigation against Vanguard. The Court concluded that there is no prohibition against the 
use of discovery in later, unrelated litigation, provided that the discovery is relevant to the 
current litigation.3 
 
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of the additional insurance agreements 
 
 Nevada’s Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to the same rules of interpretation 
as statutes.4 The Court will give effect to the plain meanings of the words, without resort 
to the rules of construction, if the statute is clear and unambiguous.5 Here, the plain 
language of NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) states that “any insurance agreement” which “may be 
liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment” be disclosed. 6  Additionally, NRCP 
16.1(a)(1)(D) states that a party “must” disclose any insurance agreement.7 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the plain language of NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of 
any and all insurance agreements that may be liable to pay a portion of the judgment 
regardless of whether the party has already disclosed policies with limits that exceed the 
party’s potential liability.  
 Furthermore, the Court supported its conclusion by discussing how federal courts 
broadly interpret FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), Nevada’s federal counterpart. Federal courts 
have rejected arguments that a party should be able to limit disclosure of insurance 
agreements to only those agreements that a party deems relevant.8 The Court noted that it 
is impossible to foresee all possible circumstances in which insurance policies will be 
subject to liability and potentially exhausted by other judgments. Therefore, Vanguard 
should not be permitted to determine which insurance policies were relevant. Finally, 
since NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires that more information be disclosed than FRCP 
26(a)(1)(A)(iv),9 it is evident that any insurance agreement which may be liable must be 
disclosed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Petitioners were required, pursuant to the plain reading of NRCP 16.1(a)(1(D), to 
produce any insurance agreement that may be liable to pay a portion of the judgment. The 
writ for mandamus or prohibition was denied. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  See Dove v. Atl. Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Fuling v. Gristede’s Operating 
Corp., 266 F.R.D. 66, 75–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
4  Webb v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 611, 618, 218 P.3d 1239, 1244 (2009).  
5  Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 128 Nev. ___, ___, 282 P.3d 751, 756 (2012). 
6  Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1(a)(1)(D). 
7  Id. 
8  See In re ML-Lee Acquisition Fund, II, L.P., 151 F.R.D. 37, 41 (D. Del. 1993). 
9  See Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1 drafter’s note (2004) (noting that NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) “expands on the federal 
rule”). 
